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Abstract.  This is a conceptual exploration of the work of some 
eminent social scientists thought to be amenable to agent-based 
modelling of social reality. Kemper’s status-power theory and 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture are the central 
theories. The article reviews empirical work on the case of 
playing children, with a focus on field studies on pre-puberty 
children in several countries. The idea is to investigate 
emergence of glass ceiling phenomena1for girls among these 
children. A prototype playground simulation gives a proof of 
concept.2The conclusion is that applying social scientific theory 
to the modelling of social reality seems a promising research 
avenue. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This text complements the NIAS-Lorentz Theme group proposal 
“emergence of the glass ceiling” (doc to be obtained from 
author). It constitutes ‘thinking aloud’ in preparation for the 
project. The first objective is to find out how Kemper’s theory 
[1] could be related to Hofstede’s dimensions of culture [2] for 
modelling human social behaviour. Kemper and Hofstede 
provide theories that address the question why people do things. 
For agent-based modelling, this is not enough: theories are also 
needed that address the question how. We do this in the light of a 
sample activity. The aim of this study is to shed light on the 
emergence of social configurations and institutions at society 
level, from activities that occur in everyday social life. For the 
NIAS-Lorentz study we chose one instance of this: the 
emergence of the glass ceiling for women in organized life. The 
studies of Hemelrijk et al. in macaque societies show that the 
violence of dominance interactions can explain both spatial 
structure and the relation of dominance position and gender [3]. 
We assume that similar processes could be at work among 
humans; but the complexity of human society is baffling. 
Children’s play has a lot of the social interaction of life, without 
the institutional complexity. It seems a fitting research 
laboratory. We therefore also discuss children’s play in agent-
based computer models. 
This is a work in progress. The theoretical coverage in this 
document is still far from complete, and so is the integration. 
Frank Dignum, Rui Prada, Ana Paiva and myself will spend the 
fall semester of 2013 working on these issues, and invite your 
thoughts.  
The paper is structured as follows. First the generic social 
scientific theories that will serve as the basis for agent behaviour 
are introduced. Then I review applied ethnographies of 
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children’s behaviour, which is the case that forms the context for 
agent behaviour. I stress the possible emergence of pattern from 
child behaviour, and its role in leading to a glass ceiling for 
women. In the next section I discuss how to use all of these 
elements in building agent-based simulations, and I present an 
example in progress. 
2 THEORY USED 
2.1. Kemper’s status-power theory 
Theodore D. Kemper (1926) spent his career exploring human 
social behaviour from a sociologist’s perspective. In his 2011 
book [1] he sums up the resulting theory. Kemper sets out to 
explain why we do what we do, more than the details of all the 
things we could possibly be doing. His theory states that our 
social behaviour revolves around the concepts of status and 
power. It could be summarized as “Make status, not power”. 
Status as Kemper uses it is not just a pecking order variable, 
though it includes that element. It is something that we 
continually both claim from one another and confer upon one 
another through our actions. An example may be the fastest way 
to explain. If, at the office, I greet X upon entering their room 
unannounced, I confer status on X; how much will be 
determined by the modalities of the greeting. My choice of 
greeting will depend on things such as our hierarchical and 
personal relationship, what preceded between us, my personality, 
the nature and urgency of the issue at hand, and whether others 
are present. At the same time, by entering unannounced I make 
the status claim of being somebody entitled to enter X’s room. 
Formally, status is the voluntary compliance with the wishes of 
another. It is a concept akin to Maslow’s [4] affiliation (the wish 
to confer status, or the status that others confer upon one), as 
well as to his dominance (status as a pecking order variable).  
Power comes into play when we want someone to do things 
and they do not voluntarily comply: we can then coerce them in 
some way, by pleading, lying or violence. The difference 
between power and status is a tricky thing; many actions have a 
power and a status component. For instance in our example, if X 
does not want to confer status upon me by hearing me, (s)he 
could look up, say “Excuse me, but I’m, very busy, could you 
come back later?” and then resume working; this might be a 
status move, indicating that I have not enough status to enter, or 
(s)he has to keep working for our common boss. I’d probably 
also interpret X’s action of resuming work as a power move – I 
would have wanted X to continue looking at me to hear my 
reason for entering, and I expect X to know this. A blatant power 
move would be if X stood up, beat me around the head and 
shoved me out of the room. Obviously, using power too rashly 
would be unwise for X. If (s)he beat me, I’d probably go around 
and tell everyone, and the result would be that X’s status in the 
wider reference group to which we both belong would be 
lowered. The only justification for such behaviour on X’s part 
would be that I had previously given X a horrible status affront – 
for instance, by declaring him/her to be a fraudulent researcher. 
Reference group is another important notion in Kemper’s 
theory. Sociologically speaking, he says, we have in our mind a 
committee of reference groups deciding about our actions. 
Sometimes this can be quite complex; e.g. when the greeting 
rules from the football club, where I play in a team with X, differ 
from those of the office, which ones to use? I might confer more 
status upon X by saying ‘Hi, Zizi’ – but other office members 
might object, and withdraw status from me, if I did that. And 
those others do not even have to be physically present; all that is 
required is that they be in our mind. Hence emotions such as 
pride, guilt or shame that we can feel when quite alone, or the 
expression ‘God forbid’. A sports team, an set of colleagues, a 
religious community, or a society, these are all reference groups 
sensu Kemper. 
Kemper’s theory posits that people attempt to maximize their 
status while protecting themselves from the power of others. 
This may sound like economic rationality re-invented. But the 
trick is that status is earned by a proper dose of status conferral 
upon others, refraining from over-claiming status with them, and 
using power in ways backed by authority granted by the 
reference groups. So people are dependent on being upstanding 
members of their reference groups for obtaining the high status 
they crave. 
The mechanism that helps people take care of their status-
power interests is called emotions. Note that when modelling 
emotions, other sources are also important, notably the 
encyclopaedic work by Frijda [5]. Kemper divides emotions into 
three main groups: Structural, situational and anticipatory 
emotions. He finally distinguishes between technical and social 
activity. Technical activities have practical goals, such as 
feeding oneself or building a tree house. They are usually carried 
out in ways that also serve relational goals, e.g. enjoying one 
another’s company (mutual status conferral). 
 
2.2. Hofstede’s dimensions of culture 
Geert Hofstede (1928), an engineer turned social scientist, was 
involved in large-scale opinion surveys at IBM international in 
the late sixties. The results showed surprising regularities, not 
across gender, tenure or job type lines but across nationalities. 
Geert decided to pursue the topic. After ten years of study he 
came up with a theory [6] that became very influential and 
much-replicated. The most recent version of that theory, 
incorporating findings from other studies, is described in [2]; 
there are now six dimensions of culture in the model, each of 
which represents one of the big issues of social life that the 
members of a society have to contend with. These issues are 
about independence, authority, aggression, anxiety, change and 
freedom. The associated dimensions are bipolar continua, on 
each of which each society takes a position. These societal traits 
are not to be confused (but, alas, often are) with personality traits 
such as those found by McCrae et al, although there are national-
level correlations [7].  
 
2.3 Status, power and culture 
Is there a relationship between Kemper’s model and Hofstede’s 
dimensions of culture? If social life revolves around status 
claims and conferrals, and power exertion and avoidance, then 
this should be reflected in dimensions of culture. We would 
expect different societies to have different propensities to use 
power, for instance; power sanctioned by a society being known 
as authority. Empirical research into this question would be very 
difficult, since Kemper’s constructs apply to real-time 
interactions between people, whereas Hofstede’s dimensions of 
culture are derived from country-wide central tendencies. We 
can speculate, however, that the dimensions point to systematic 
differences in how the people in a culture tend to act – thus both 
enacting and perpetuating their culture, and sometimes 
modifying it. 
Some support for this position can be found in the fact that at 
country level, Hofstede’s dimensions strongly correlate with the 
big five personality factors [7, 8] – so correlations between 
constructs at society level and averages of constructs at 
individual level can happen, and be meaningful. For instance, the 
personality factor of neuroticism correlates positively with 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, and I have interpreted 
this as ‘fear’ in what follows.  
In what follows I present an account of each dimension of 
culture in Kemperian terms, followed by an example of two 
countries that differ particularly much on that dimension.  
Individualism is about who are the reference groups in the 
mind of an agent, taken into account when the agent considers if 
an action is status-conferring. In an individualistic society, these 
might be several, differing in their reach of control over the 
agent’s mind. They might include heroes, friends, or one’s 
nuclear family members, deities and fiction characters as well. 
Different reference groups form what Kemper calls the 
‘reference group committee’ and they pull the actor in different 
directions. In a collectivistic setting, there is likely to be one 
inclusive reference group, the extended family, clan, or people, 
that overwhelms the others. Also, a lot more behaviour is 
scripted from a societal role point of view in a collectivistic 
setting. Another aspect of individualism is that technical 
activities sensu Kemper are more likely to be the basis for 
creating a reference group (‘task force’), whereas in collectivistic 
societies, existing reference groups will be the likely group to 
execute technical activities. A stark contrast on the dimension of 
individualism is formed by the United States and Indonesia. 
Power distance is about voluntary status-accord to others, 
and granting of authority, based on ascribed characteristics, not 
on actions. The net effect is that default status-accord in an 
interaction will be asymmetric: participants will seek to find out 
their respective status, and if they deem themselves inferior in 
ascribed status, they will give way. Some status markers are age 
and gender. Obvious power can also serve as a status marker, 
and anyone who is obviously powerful may acquire undisputed 
status. Small power distance stands for symmetric status-accord. 
Institutions in such a society will prevent accumulation of wealth 
and power: progressive taxes, democratic elections. For a 
contrast on this dimension, compare Israel with Russia. 
Masculinity is about voluntary status-accord to others based 
on their performance in competitive settings – in other words, 
based on their power. It is also about fear that powerful others 
will use that power against one’s own power. The net effect is 
that people in interaction tend to seek status either by winning 
competitive sequences (not just fighting or sports, but also 
having a bigger car, being more elegant, having higher marks, 
cracking one-upmanship jokes, having more publications…), or 
by aligning themselves with powerful ‘winners’ (presidential 
candidates, deities, sports heroes). The converse, femininity, 
stands for voluntary status-accord to those who refrain from 
using or showing power, and a reluctance to use power, or to 
accept authority when it is enacted in powerful ways. In 
masculine societies, games will be about winning, while in 
feminine ones, they will be about participating. For a contrast on 
this dimension, compare The United Kingdom with Sweden. 
Uncertainty avoidance is about fear of the power of others, 
though not specific others (as might happen in a masculine 
culture), but generalized anxiety in the face of anyone or 
anything unknown. It is also about potential status loss for acting 
in strange ways, since such acting might release these anxieties. 
Conversely it is about status accord to anything that brings 
safety, e.g. a known person, boss, or leader; a specialism, 
expertise. Uncertainty tolerance stands for confidence in one’s 
own power and, as a result, willingness to face the unknown and 
to trust institutions and generic good sense. Greece and 
Singapore provide a striking contrast on this dimension.  
Long-term orientation is about renouncing to immediate status 
claims or conferrals. This happens because each claim or 
conferral is done with a view to its effect on the potential for 
status claims at a later time. Short-term orientation, on the other 
hand, is about taking status conferral in the here and now very 
seriously. One expects to confer and receive status to the full, 
regardless of what may happen later – because not doing so 
would be a great status loss. One zooms in to life at the moment, 
as it were. This makes moral issues very important, as opposed 
to pragmatic ones. A strong contrast on this dimension exists 
between Japan and Iran. 
Indulgence is about allowing free-form opportunities for 
status conferral to oneself or others, including what Kemper calls 
‘the organism’. The idea is that role prescriptions and rules can 
be relaxed or forgotten, which leaves room for all kinds of play 
and indulgence: in play, food, sex, or violence. The opposite, 
restraint, holds when constraints are taken very seriously, and 
infringements lead to loss of status. Hence, people are likely to 
use non-organismic ways of claiming and conferring status, 
‘sublimating’ the organismic ways. Countries at the extremes of 
this dimension are Mexico and Pakistan. 
If these suggestions hold water, it should be possible to use 
them in agent-based models of social behaviour that use both 
Kemper and Hofstede. Where Hofstede jr. [9] asserts that 
everybody plays the moral circle game whatever they do – with 
localized differences in the unwritten rules -, Kemper adds that 
this is a status-power game, and he speaks of the ‘reference 
group committee’ in people’s mind that guides their decisions. 
Reference group and moral circle boils down to the same thing. 
 
Theodore Kemper informally suggested the following short 
formulations, that would be perfect for use in models, but might 
be cutting some corners: 
“As I read the six culture dimensions, they are amenable to 
construal in status-power terms in the following way: 
i) Individualism-collectivism is a society's specification for the 
unit that has the right to claim and receive status.  
ii) Large vs small power distance is the willingness to accept 
status and/or power domination. 
iii) Masculinity vs femininity is a preference for either power-
oriented or status-oriented social relations. 
iv) Uncertainty tolerance is the rigidity with which status-power 
rules are mandated to be followed.  
v) Long vs short term orientation is a matter of how change in 
status-power rules is accepted. 
vii) Indulgence vs restraint is the degree of control over 
organismic satisfaction (a matter of status claiming)”.  
 
3 SEX DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S PLAY 
 
3.1 Ethnographic studies 
Our case is children’s play. Kemper does not, in his 2011 book, 
take up the differences between the sexes. There is other 
research about this though, that could be interpreted in the light 
of status-power theory to create different boy and girl agents. 
Lever [10] spent a year studying 181 fifth-grade primary school 
children in Connecticut (age 8-12) at three middle-class schools. 
She used four methods: observation on schoolyards, interviews, 
questionnaires, and diaries. Excluding e.g. TV watching, she 
found six differences: 
• Girls played more with dolls or board games, mimicking 
primary human relationships, while boys played sports or 
“war” outdoors. 
• Boys played in large groups more often. This is related to the 
first point. Even girls outdoors played in smaller groups: tag, 
hopscotch or jump-rope require fewer participants than team 
sports. 
• Boys played more in age-heterogeneous groups, admitting 
younger boys when the game required more participants 
• Girls more often played in “male” games than vice versa. 
Girls could be used by the boys for a sports team if no boy 
was available. They would then seriously try to play. When 
boys joined in girls’ games, it was as “buffoons” or to tease, 
and they were not censured. 
• Boys played competitive games more often than girls. If one 
distinguishes between play and game, in which only the 
latter have a formal aim and winners, 65% of the boys’ 
activities consisted of games versus 35% of the girls’. 
• Boys’ activities lasted longer. 72% of the boys’ activities 
lasted longer than an hour, against 43% of the girls’. 
Lever interprets her data as follows. First, the ceiling of skill is 
higher for boys, so that they keep being challenged by their 
games. Kemper might add that the challenge is also sustained 
because the boys’ games are more politically complex than the 
girls’ games and include power moves. Second, boys were found 
to resolve their disputes more effectively. They quarrelled a lot 
but never let it end their games – actually they also enjoyed the 
squabbles, especially those who were not particularly proficient 
in the game itself. Kemper would say that status could be gained 
through these conflict resolution sessions. By contrast, girls 
played games that avoided ambiguous, conflict-prone situations. 
And if such situations occurred, as in girls’ soccer, the girls 
tended to argue about fairness and leave. They also had problems 
deciding on choosing sides, deciding who was captain or even 
which game to play. Kemper might here say that apparently, 
creative moves by one girl were interpreted by the others as 
power moves in the relationship – and not tolerated. 
Girls often played in pairs of “best friends” that reached great 
emotional intimacy, and could be interrupted by a third party, 
leading to a kind of serial monogamy of best friends. Where girls 
learned intimate relational skills, boys learned more instrumental 
relational skills towards ‘generalized others’. While these data 
are obviously situated in place and history, similar differences 
seem to obtain in the Netherlands in 2012, according to my 
unguided observations – but this would need checking. Anyway, 
to cite Lever [10, p. 458]: “…the world of play and game 
activity may be a major force in the development and 
perpetuation of differential abilities between the sexes”. This is a 
good justification for studying children’s play.  
Barrie Thorne [11] also did extensive field work at primary 
schools in the USA. She found many of the same phenomena as 
Lever. She adds thoughtful interpretation about how same-age 
grouping and public visibility enhance gender salience. Games in 
which there was explicit team formation had more gender 
separation than games in which individuals could join. She 
concludes that the how of gender separation may be a good place 
to start looking for the why. Thorne also remarks that dominance 
is important: dominant kids tend to be male, but on occasion 
dominant girl troupes (11-12 years old, when girls can be bigger 
and stronger than boys) would roam the playground.  
Of course one expects to find a different picture when 
studying younger children. Martínez-Lozano et al [12] studied 5-
6 year-old children at play in schoolyards. They focused on 
conflict issues, strategies and outcomes. They collected data in 
Andalusia, Spain and Utrecht, the Netherlands, in both urban and 
rural contexts. Sex differences they found across these sites, 
hence regardless of national culture, were: 
• Issue: Girls had more conflicts about possession of objects or 
space, boys about control of play behaviour. 
• Strategy: girls negotiated more while boys ordered, argued, 
suggested, explained, or accused. 
• Outcome: boys submitted more frequently, while girls 
reached compromises. 
It is tempting to surmise that these differences are caused by the 
girls being more focused on the relationship, whereas for the 
boys, the joint play activity was more important. If this is true, it 
is in line with Lever’s findings in the USA thirty years earlier.  
Conflict resolution in play could be a good topic for agent-
based modelling, since from a relational point of view, conflicts 
endanger the aim of achieving status, as well as potentially 
involving power, so agents will have a drive to avoid or resolve 
them. 
Developmental psychologists Steenbeek and Van Geert [13] 
developed dynamic and agent-based models of dyadic child play, 
and validated their models by performing an experimental study 
with 48 6-7 year-olds in the Netherlands, using sociometric 
status (‘popular’, ‘normal’, or ‘rejected’, with girls being over-
represented in the latter category) as an independent variable; 
this can throw some light on the issue. Their model, though not 
explicitly using status-power theory, would easily be 
interpretable in its terms. It posits four theoretical principles: 
1. behaviour is intentional and goal-directed (this also fits the 
BDI framework for agents; see below) 
2. goals represent concerns in the sense of Frijda [5]; these are 
similar to status and power concerns in Kemper 
3. social interaction is a goal in itself (allowing mutual status 
conferral, Kemper might say) 
4. behaviour is affected by non-intentional copying and 
mimicking (again: conferring status), preferentially of 
children with high status or power. 
The authors found some unexpected things in their empirical 
study. The setup was that dyads were assembled for the occasion 
and left to play at a table with a video recorder for fifteen 
minutes. Later, the sequences were coded according a theory-
based model based on the principles above. ‘Rejected’ children 
turned out to be more ‘other-directed’ and ‘positive’, while 
‘popular’ children showed ‘negative expression’ more often. The 
status-power explanation might be that, since the popular 
children were not in danger of walking off to find other popular 
children, the ‘rejected’ ones were free to try and make 
themselves loved – acquire status – while the popular ones could 
punish (refuse to accord status). 
Another feature of the study that merits consideration for the 
present proposal is that not only single playing sessions were 
modelled, but there was also a model about the long-term 
development of patterns that could result from repeated 
interactions. This methodology allows to get a grip on emergent 
patterns of behaviour. 
A recent study by Tessa Lansu [14] on Dutch 10-12 year olds 
showed that children who professed liking dominant other 
children really showed repulsion to those others in subconscious 
responses. In particular, aggressive girls really disliked powerful 
others, contrary to boys. Popular girls were sensitive of others’ 
needs, again contrary to boys. This puts into question the 
relationship between ‘liking’ or status-accord, power and fear in 
the context of children’s groups. Since a similar pattern of 
avoidance of power by girls, in this case rough-and-tumble play, 
was found in pre-schoolers in the USA [15] it seems to be a 
robust finding across age and culture, that might explain some of 
the patterns found in ethnographic studies.  
To conclude: the topic of child play, with age, sex and 
relative status-power as conspicuous variables and across 
different time scales, seems a promising topic for the study, both 
from a theoretical perspective and from a practical one. 
 
3.2 Emergent structures and children’s play 
Children’s play is widely interpreted as preparing for later life. 
The idea is that children play games in which they learn to enact 
roles and keep to certain social configurations. Being a boy or a 
girl is usually believed to be important for children’s play. The 
studies mentioned above support this idea: there is a clear 
differentiation between play by boys and girls. Traditionally, the 
debate about why men and women behave as they do has been 
caught in the nature versus nurture debate. Recently, self-
organization, leading to emergent structures, has been added 
[16]. Hemelrijk puts it thus ([16], p.224): “It appears that the 
discovery of cognitively simpler explanations is furthered by the 
use of self-organization models”.  Whether and how self-
organization leads to emergent results at society level in adult 
life will be a major question in this research.  There could be 
three perspectives on this question: nature, emergence, or 
nurture. 
• Nature: Boys and girls are biologically different, and 
therefore go on to play different roles is whatever society.  
• Emergence: There are regularities about status and 
dominance interactions between boys and girls, that scale up 
to adult life, leading to patterns and institutions in society. 
• Nurture: It is the pressure of adults and peers that lead boys 
and girls along different developmental paths. 
The nature hypothesis, while undeniably containing truth, 
does not do well in explaining cultural differences and societal 
changes. The other two are needed for filling out these details. 
This study can help uncover whether the emergence perspective 
can explain part of the picture.  
What are the things that might emerge? Hemelrijk’s [16, 17] 
studies can be an inspiration here. Based on a single variable, 
‘despoticism’, she found emerging gender role division and 
spatial structures in macaque populations. Hemelrijk started with 
a population of 10-12 individuals who were all of equal status, 
except for sex differences (males being larger) that could vary 
across macaque species. Then these individuals engaged in 
interactions as in fig 1 – and in nothing else. Despoticism 
modelled the violence of dominance interactions – in other 
words the amount of power used – and the effect on scalar status 
of winning or losing such an interaction. This makes it a concept 
akin to the cultural dimension of masculinity / femininity. 
Unexpected outcomes lead to more status change, both for their 
winners and their losers, than do expected outcomes. The 
aggression level of an attack also changes the status effect. In 
more despotic macaques, e.g. rhesus monkeys, male losers of 
fights lost so much status and felt so bad that they moved to the 
outside of the group, in order to get away from their vanquishers. 
This led to a typical spatial structure known from baboon rocks 
in zoos where the dominant males occupy the centre, and the 
subordinate animals the periphery. Females, being smaller than 
males, would be numerous on the outskirts of the group. Males 
and females thus lived in different social spheres. Recent male 
losers who had fled from the centre were subsequently 
vulnerable to further loss – also against the females who could 
be found there, and some of whom might feel really dominant 
after just having beaten other females. Actually, the smaller the 
power of females compared to males in the model, the steeper 
the hierarchy among females would become, and the more 
despotic females would on average become. At the ‘egalitarian’ 
(in Hemelrijk’s terms), feminine (in Hofstede terms ) end of the 
scale, stump-tailed macaques resolve their dominance issues by 
staring one another down, without resorting to power use such as 
biting. As a result, losers did not lose much of their scalar status 
and did not move away, individuals of both sexes would mix in a 
rather homogeneous way, individuals would live closer together, 
attack one another (that is, stare down) more often, yet no 
females would ever rise above any males in the status hierarchy. 
In the model Groofiworld, in which individuals would groom 
those whose power they feared, egalitarian groups would show 
more grooming – also because they were freely mixed and 
would often encounter others they feared. An interesting side 
thought is that these egalitarian, status-conferring groups might 
also constitute a natural laboratory for theory of mind since 
everyone is continually at close quarters with people who might 
have to be groomed. 
If similar, but more complex dynamics obtain in humans, then 
one would expect male and female social circles to be more 
separate in more masculine societies, with males typically in the 
powerful roles. Yet one would also expect to have relatively 
more, rather than fewer, powerful women in these masculine 
societies – ceteris paribus. DomWorld produced relatively more 
female dominance in those groups (of size 10-12, in the model) 
in which the hierarchy was steep and/or females were scarce, and 
empirical results among primates confirmed this – this might be 
another phenomenon that occurs in humans, especially in 
masculine societies. Men fighting one another down around rare 
women at the top – it sounds like something familiar. 
Supposing that the expected differences at society level 
between Great Britain and the Netherlands can be found, how 
will this inform our simulations? It makes sense to expect that a 
lot of adult social structure is formed, or at least some of its 
primitives are formed, during childhood. For instance one would 
expect more overt antagonism and power use in GB than in NL, 
and less boy-girl interaction, with boys occupying central spaces 
on the playground. At the same time one would expect certain 
girls to be dominant over certain boys more often in GB than in 
NL. And probably, these things would vary considerably in 
relation to development, notably puberty. We can safely expect 
that sexual attractiveness will increase boys’ conferral of the 
status to girls who ‘meet standards’ as Kemper puts it, and this 
will affect older children more than younger ones. The age at 
which, and extent to which sex issues change the game probably 
also change with social class, depending on future prospects; if 
one expects a long life, then sex becomes less important [18]. 
In order to discover these emergent effects, it is preferable to 
study groups of children in free play rather than just dyads. 
Emergent effects could be: in masculine culture, children might 
use more space, have steeper hierarchies, have less spatial 
overlap between boys and girls with boys at centre space, have 
fewer power-free status exchanges. A modification could occur 
if competitive games come into the picture: they could be a 
legitimized form of power use while conferring status on all 





In order to be able to simulate, any ambiguities in theories used, 
or conceptual holes between them, must be resolved. Here are 
some preliminary ideas that might be usable. 
 
4.1 Simulating children’s play 
We shall try to build models that are as simple as possible, while 
still allowing to grasp cross-cultural variation in social 
behaviour. Kemper’s parsimonious model makes it possible to 
build models of social behaviour in which agents are driven by 
status-power considerations. Our ambition now is to look at 
social behaviour in the absence of an economic decision. We 
choose the subject of children’s play. This topic is chosen for its 
obviously social and relational nature, without ulterior economic 
motive [19], for its assumable role in the emergence of social, 
culture-bound patterns, and also because there are empirical data 
available, or obtainable, across cultures.  
In Hemelrijk’s models [16, p. 225], status-power dynamics 
also obtain. Agents are driven to claim status with or without use 
of power, if they meet an individual whom they think is weaker; 
else, they confer status by grooming if they fear the other’s 
power. Would we find similar dynamics in children? 
Complementarity Theory by U.S. anthropologist Alan Page 
Fiske [20] posits that there is a co-evolution of innate 
psychological capacities in children with culture-specific co-
ordination devices; this is exactly what we would like to grow in 
our models, and it reminds the ‘how’ question of gender salience 
put by Barrie Thorne. Fiske puts it as follows (p. 76):  
”Putting proclivities together with congruent paradigms, 
children learn to construct culture-specific coordination devices 
that enable them to interact in locally meaningful ways. The 
evolved proclivities and cultural paradigms are complementary: 
Both are necessary but neither is sufficient to permit complex 
social coordination.” 
Kemper’s theory can provide the essence of our ‘evolved 
proclivities’, while Hofstede’s dimensions can provide the core 
of cross-cultural variations. We should this be able to use them 
to create an agent-based Complementarity Theory laboratory. 
Kemper’s theory can be used in agents’ state variables about the 
status they believe they have with others, and the status they 
believe others are claiming, and the status they are willing to 
confer on others. They need state variables about the power they 
believe they have, and their fear of the power of others. 
Hofstede’s theory can be used as salience mechanisms and filters 
various element of agents’ social functioning.  
For these ‘various elements’ in agent-based models, theories 
about the mechanism of interaction are needed. Agents need to 
perceive one another’s actions, interpret them, and respond. 
They need a memory too. Current architectures for social 
interaction among agents are often based on two frameworks 
[21]: the Beliefs-Desires-Intentions (BDI) model for agent minds 
[22], and the Ortony-Clore-Collins (OCC) theory for emotional 
appraisal by agents [23]. Both models can be used with the 
theories presented here. OCC includes ‘praiseworthiness’ and 
‘blameworthiness’ and these are directly translatable to status 
conferral and withdrawal à la Kemper. 
A micro-theory about the simulation’s topic, i.e. about what 
actions play involves, will be needed too, and we shall consider 
that.  
Several kinds of simulations with different level of detail can 
be considered. In detail simulations, play sessions with set rules 
can be modelled – possibly with embodied agents [24], but not 
necessarily - and the emergent results collected across runs. In 
zoomed-out simulations, the emergence of co-ordinating devices 
such as norms and rules [25] can be studied. Simulations can be 
made that allow rules to change across time, or across groups. It 
is quite conceivable that in children’s play there are punctuated 
equilibria, in which new groups are much more likely to come 
up with new patterns than existing ones. This would e.g. appear 
from the work of Ballato [26] on risk behaviours in adolescents. 
 
4.2 Simulating with Kemper’s model 
We saw that according to Kemper people, hence also agents in 
models that use his theory, are dependent on their reference 
groups for obtaining the high status they crave. This leads to 
complex emergent status results for group interaction sequences. 
A game might be enjoyable, with everyone gaining status, or it 
might lead to a fight resulting in bad feeling. In status terms, this 
would mean that everyone in the reference group loses status, 
which could in the long run lead to dissolution of that group. 
In play, usual constraints and obligations are suspended to 
allow maximum mutual status conferral and absence of power 
use. The only power that can and should be freely used is 
creative power.  
My own surmise is that children are only free to play when 
they have a comfortable level of status in the group, and are free 
from fear of the power of others -in other words, if they feel safe. 
This is for instance nicely shown in the book Momo by Michael 
Ende [27]. Momo is a little foundling girl who lives in an 
abandoned amphitheatre, where both children and grown-ups 
like to come visit her. The other children can play better when 
Momo is part of the group, and why? Because Momo confers a 
lot of status and never uses power. She can listen so well that all 
who meet her end up feeling confident and happy with 
themselves. 
In Kemper’s terms, if we consider children in dramatic play, 
four types of moves are possible: 
• Status claim, e.g. “I want to be the queen!”  
• Status conferral, e.g. “You be the king.”  
• Assertion of power, e.g. “If I cannot be the queen, I will not 
play.” 
• Accepting other's power: "All right, come back and play. 
You can be the queen." 
Note that each action of any player could belong to more than 
one of these types at the same time, and that what B perceives 
could differ from what A intends. For instance, after A has 
introduced the dragon, if B interprets it as a power move, B 
could say “And here comes the dragon-drowning cloud, raining 
down upon the dragon and quenching its fire!” This confers 
status upon the A for taking up the dragon idea, but also takes 
status away from A’s dragon – which might be seen by A as 
another power move in the real world, or just as a play move. It 
also supposedly confers status upon B for coming up with such a 
clever idea. 
 
4.3 Simulating with Hofstede’s model 
The Hofstede model comes into the story once a generic model 
functions. The agents can then be assigned to cultures, and the 
culture dimensions can be used in decision functions to modify 
the state variables and behavioural tendencies. Hofstede’s model 
has already shown to be amenable to modelling cross-cultural 
behaviour in such a manner in agent-based models [28, 29]. 
These models, however, take a very simple situation as their 
focus: a one-on-one negotiation in the former paper, and a 
single-person decision in the latter. Both involve economic 
decisions about buying. Neither of them zooms in to the 
relational details of the topic. 
In a model of children’s play conflict resolution similar to 
Martínez-Lozano et al.’s, one could model culture by having 
cultural meta-norms [30] modify the decision functions about 
conflict perception, strategy, and outcome. Cultural meta-norms 
specify behavioural tendencies given a certain relational 
situation. For instance, in the Martínez-Lozano study, Dutch 
children ended their conflicts more often by walking away, while 
Spanish children preferred to submit. The authors explain this 
through the differences in Individualism in the national cultures 
(Nl: 80, Es: 51). In agents, the individualism score can be used 
as a modifier for the cultural meta-norm about how to renounce 
to having it one’s way in a conflict, i.e. in this case, the decision 
to walk away or submit. What the authors do not say is that the 
dimension of power distance could also contribute to explaining 
the outcome. With PDI=57, Spain would see more submission 
than the Netherlands (PDI = 38). 
 
5 META-MODEL FOR SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
5.1 Rich model 
I shall now think ahead about possible model elements. This is 
really work to do during the project, and it will be dependent 
upon further decision about the scope of the subject matter. For 
instance, free play - in which there could be fission / fusion of 
groups across sessions, very relevant to human social life - is 
conceptually more complicated than game play – in which there 
are explicit group boundaries and rules. Larger groups are more 
complicated than dyads. We also depend on the empirical data 
that we can get our hands on. 
Agent classes 
A possible meta-model for the structure of agents has to take into 
account reference groups as well as individual agents. Moreover, 
people tend to use not just other people, but also other entities as 
sources of status conferral or claims, or of power: symbolic 
entities, groups, heroes, fictitious characters, deities. 
A first try could be to use a meta-model akin to AGR [31]. In 
our model, an agent would be a status-power actor – and this 
would really be a supertype of which various kinds of persons, 
entities and groups could be subtypes. A Role would indicate the 
relationship between two status-power actors, and have scalar 
status and authority (that is, power sanctioned by the group) 
attached to it; it could be group membership (between an 
individual and a group), or friendship (between two individuals), 
or a formal, authority-carrying role (mother, president, 
secretary). Roles could have norms attached to them, about e.g. 
authority to use certain power moves  that comes with a role. 
Agent drives and emotions 
Agents will be driven by status-power considerations according 
to Kemper, that is they strive to achieve status (possibly using 
power), confer status on those who meet their standards, and 
avoid others’ power. For brevity’s sake I skip this elaboration. 
Interaction dynamics 
In order for any model to run, agents will need to behave. Other 
agents will need to perceive, interpret, and reciprocate. Each 
action will be interpreted by the acting agent, as well as by other 
agents, in status-power terms, and the interpretations could differ 
– particularly if the agents have different cultures. The agents’ 
actions could also have a practical side that feds into the status-
power dynamics. 
Which behaviours to use will depend on empirical factors. 
Studies on children’s plays can be of use here. 
An agent-based model of children’s play should minimally 
contain the four types of intentions / interpretations of moves 
(status claim, status conferral, power assertion, power 
acceptance / refusal), without necessarily containing any worked 
instances – that is, there does not need to be a physical or verbal 
form for the moves. Each child agent should have state variables 
for its status with the others, and its fear of the power of the 
others. These variables could be dyadic, even in larger groups. 
Group-level variables could emerge when there is sufficient 
alignment between the dyadic variables, so when the group 
members agree among themselves about status. Children should 
also have propensities to making each of the types of moves 
depending on their status and power state variables. There also 
needs to be a closure criterion for joint activity. If the simulation 
is about child play, when the total mutual status conferral drops 
below a certain level, participants will leave the game; otherwise 
they might stop through external causes, e.g. when they reach an 
exhaustion threshold. 
The ideas presented in this section are by no means the only 
conceivable way to instantiate Kemper’s and Hofstede’s 
theories. The role of empirical evidence will have to grow. There 
can be many different simulations of various games, settings, age 
groups. The counts-as operator can map instantiated concepts 
from those various simulations to the status-power primitives 
that form the basis of our work. 
 
5.2 Minimal model in Netlogo: Playground 
To give a first impression of how Kemper and Hofstede can be 
used, without instantiating any behaviour beyond the theoretical 
concepts, I developed a small model in Netlogo 5.0.4. (figure 1). 
It uses the theory above. No validity testing has happened at the 
time of writing, so the current version is based on literature only. 
The model has been kept extremely simple, and will only be 
made more intricate if the simpler model does not yield any 
emergent result. For the moment the children have no relational 
memory and no theory of mind, and minimal emotions. The 
main logic runs as follows: Agents are boys and girls. They have 
two Kemperian variables: beauty, and power. Beauty makes one 
more likely to receive status, while power is used in quarrels. All 
agents look for one or more friends and then start to perform 
status exchanges. The only difference between boys and girls is 
that girls avoid exchanging status with more powerful others, in 
line with the findings in [14] and [15]. If they feel short-sold on 
status, they may start a quarrel. Power, beauty and culture 
parameters modify these exchanges. 
    A status exchange during play involves two children in the 
same group (shown by colour) conferring status upon one 
another. This models a micro-interaction within the group 
process, such as one child playing the ball to another, smiling at 
it, or racing it, and the other interpreting that action as 
appropriately nice, more so, or less so. The dynamics of the 
Kemperian exchanges are modified by Hofstedian culture 
parameters. Large Power distance makes a child gauge the status 
conferral by relative power, so that it expects larger conferrals 
from less powerful others. Note that so far we do not use a 
separate measure of social status here, only physical power; the 
playground is not a multi-class place. Masculinity makes a child 
less tolerant of a status deficit. 
 
    ifelse status-conferral + (power-distance * power) >  
           mate-status-conferral + (power-distance * your-power) + 
                   ((100 - masculinity) / 33)    [ get angry ] 
 
An angry child may pick a quarrel, which is a Kemperian power 
exchange. A quarrel is a comparison of both children’s power, 
and thus the stronger sex (determined by a slider) are more likely 
to win fights than girls. The winner plays on with the group and 
gains a little power. The loser becomes unhappy and loses a little 
power. These power changes vary with masculinity – modelling 
level of fierceness of the fight. If a too large fraction in a group 
are unhappy, the group dissolves.  
So far, an emergent effect of power distance, in combination 
with children’s power, is to make fighting more likely, since 
exchanges become more asymmetrical. Masculinity also leads to 
more fighting. The corner testing so far seemed to indicate an 
emergent gender-related pattern of boys being slightly happier 
when fights occurred; this is due to their greater average power.  
More interesting, and reminiscent of Hemelrijk’s work, is the 
effect of girls’ avoidance of others’ power. This leads to boys 
starting more fights and being more likely to become dominant 
(increase their power), even if girls are stronger on average. 
Of course, at the time of writing, the above is no more than a 
small first step. The fact that emergent gendered patters occur 
even if girls and boys do not consciously avoid one another is 
promising. Kemper seems very useful as a generic model that 
can be instantiated for various cases – in this case, child play. 
Hofstede has the same properties of being generic and 
instantiable, but national culture is a population-level concept. 
Ideally, culture as a system-level property should emerge from 
agent-based models rather than being a set of input variables; but 
then we are speaking of evolutionary models. Creating these is a 
tall order. In a model that does not span across generations, 
national culture can be assumed to be constant [2] and thus be 
used as a set of parameters. If the basic Kemperian process 
dynamics are well modelled, thoughtful incorporation of 
ethnographic findings like [12] from several cultures could allow 
calibrated use of culture sliders. Face validation of the model by 
experts from various cultures is also possible. 
 
Figure 1: partial window of a sample run with culture 
parameters set to 50. With these settings, some groups form in 
which fights are hushed. Children fight initially, losers are sad 
and run off. Gradually, stable groups form and fights are 
hushed, leading to neutral, subdued faces. The run shows one 
remaining unstable pair happily playing (top left). 
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